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2Optimal Apartment Cleaning by Harried College Students: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis
Abstract
In this note we use a simple game model to analyze the optimal cleanup of an apartment that
is shared by  college students who are pressed for time. From an individual standpoint, these
students dislike cleaning. However, they also prefer a clean apartment to a dirty one. Hence, for any
student  where  this student’s utility is the total number of hours spent by all the 
students cleaning less a number  times the hours spent cleaning by himself. In this setting, we first
determine the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when the number  is less than unity. Second, we
find the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when  is greater than unity. Finally, for specific values
of  and  we investigate whether the second Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient. 
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3See Tietjen (2015) for more details on this point and for a listing of the dormitory capacities of a whole host of universities in the
United States.
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See Ogletree et al. (2005, 2006) and Yadegaran (2013a, 2013b) for a more detailed corroboration of this claim. 
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1. Introduction
College students in the United States typically spend their first (freshman) and sometimes
their second (sophomore) year living in dormitories. However, once they are past this stage of their
college careers, these same students frequently move to both on- and off-campus apartments. In
some universities, quite apart from a desire for greater independence on the part of the students, such
a move is required by the fact that the pertinent university is able to guarantee housing only to a
fraction of all enrolled students.3
In most universities, dormitory living generally does not entail any serious cleaning activities
on the part of the students because of the routine presence of custodial staff. However, this state of
affairs clearly changes once students move into apartments. In this new living arrangement, the
cleanliness of a shared apartment depends fundamentally on the effort exerted by the individual
students in keeping this apartment clean. 
The available evidence clearly demonstrates that students sharing apartments routinely get
into conflicts because of, inter alia, their heterogeneous preferences for cleanliness.4 Therefore, it
is no surprise that stories about the supposed disadvantages of living either with “neatfreaks” or with
“slobs” are legion in American popular culture. University departments of residential life and
housing commonly advise students about the ways in which they can avoid conflicts stemming from
misunderstood or ill defined apartment cleaning chores. Hence, the problem of the appropriate
division of responsibilities for cleaning a shared apartment is both endemic and pertinent. 
5Many contemporary textbooks such as Tadelis (2013) contain lucid discussions of static games of complete information. 
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This notwithstanding, to the best of our knowledge, economists have paid no attention to this
apartment cleanup problem that we have just alluded to. Given this lacuna in the literature, the
purpose of this note is to use a simple game model to analyze the optimal cleanup of an apartment
that is shared by  college students who are pressed for time. From an individual standpoint,
these students dislike cleaning. However, they also all prefer a clean apartment to a dirty one.
Therefore, for any student  where  this student’s utility is the total number of hours spent
by all the  students cleaning less a number  times the hours spent cleaning by himself. Section
2.1 describes the static game of complete information5 model we employ to conduct the analysis.
Section 2.2 ascertains the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when the number  is less than unity.
Section 2.3 determines the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when  is greater than unity. In section
2.4, for specific values of  and  we investigate whether the Nash equilibrium we have
determined in section 2.3 is Pareto efficient. Section 3 concludes and then offers two suggestions
for extending the research described in this note.
2. Analysis
2.1. The game model
Consider a scenario in which  college students share an apartment. Each of these  students
has a fixed number of hours available to him that can be used to clean this apartment. Let us denote
this fixed endowment of time that is measured in hours by  What makes the apartment cleanup
problem interesting is the fact that even though each student, from an individual perspective, dislikes
cleaning, collectively, these same students prefer a clean apartment to a dirty one.
5The amount of time spent cleaning the apartment by the  student is denoted by  The
number  is as explained above in section 1. Putting these two pieces of information together, the 
student’s utility function is given by
(1)
As written, the  student’s utility is given by the sum of two terms. The first term on the right-hand-
side (RHS) of equation (1) is the positive contribution to utility stemming from the total time devoted
to cleaning the apartment by all the students sharing the apartment under study. The second term on
the RHS is the negative contribution to utility arising form the displeasure experienced by the 
student from time spent cleaning the apartment by himself. We assume that all the college students
simultaneously determine how much time they would like to spend cleaning their apartment. Given
this background, our task now is to determine the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when the number 
is less than unity.
2.2. The Nash equilibrium when d<1
We begin by rewriting the  student’s utility function in equation (1). This gives us 
(2)
Inspecting equation (2), we see that the  student’s utility function is linear in both his own time
6spent cleaning up  and in the cleanup times of this student’s remaining   apartment mates
 When  every additional amount of time  that student  spends cleaning the apartment
contributes to his utility by the amount  Put differently, because the  student’s utility
function is linear and increasing in his decision variable  it is optimal to set  at its upper bound
which is  In words, when  it is optimal for any student  to spend all of his available time of 
hours to clean the apartment he lives in. 
The reader should note that using calculus to maximize the utility function given in equation
(2) by choosing  does not give the correct answer because, using this approach, we get  which
is clearly incorrect because we are studying the case where  The reason why calculus misleads
is that the optimal solution in this case is not an interior point of the feasible set  In other
words, the unique Nash equilibrium we have found is a corner solution in which it is optimal to set 
for all  What happens to this Nash equilibrium when  We now proceed to answer this
question.
2.3. The Nash equilibrium when d>1
In this case, every additional amount of time  that the  student spends cleaning his
apartment contributes to his utility by the amount  Therefore, because of the rationale
given in section 2.2 above, it is now optimal to set the decision variable  at its lower bound and this
means that  for all  So, once again the unique Nash equilibrium we have found is a
corner solution but this solution is at the other corner of the feasible set  In this equilibrium,
7none of the students spend any time cleaning the apartment that they are all sharing and hence the
utility accruing to all of them is equal to zero. We now proceed to our final task and that is to
determine whether the unique Nash equilibrium we have just found is Pareto efficient. 
2.4. Pareto efficiency
To illustrate the nature of our findings thus far, let us specialize the discussion to the case
where there are five college students who share the apartment under study and hence  In
addition, suppose that  Now, if the section 2.3 Nash equilibrium involving no cleanup
whatsoever and zero utilities to all the students is Pareto efficient then it should not be possible to
improve upon this equilibrium. 
To ascertain whether this Nash equilibrium is or is not Pareto efficient, suppose that the
apartment landlord, disgusted with how filthy his apartment has become, gives the resident college
students the following ultimatum: “Either clean up or be evicted.” Faced with possible eviction, the
students all increase the amount of time they devote to cleaning up the apartment from  to 
for  In this case, substituting  into the utility function in equation (2), we see
that the  student’s utility now is 
(3)
Equation (3) clearly tells us that the section 2.3 Nash equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. In addition,
inspecting equation (3) we see that relative to the Nash equilibrium with no cleanup, the  students
sharing the apartment are clearly better off with some  cleanup. 
8Generalizing the above argument, we see that every time the  student increases his cleanup
time by  the impact on his utility is negative and equal to  However, this same
increase in cleanup raises the utilities of all the other students by  Therefore, if each individual
student raises the time he devotes to cleaning the apartment by  then the gain to each individual
student equals his loss. However, this same action on his part increases the gain to all the other
students by  and the total gain is  which equals  in this specific case. From this line of
reasoning, it should be clear that the section 2.3 Nash equilibrium can not only be improve upon but
that the best outcome arises when every student selects the maximum available time  to clean
the apartment under study. 
3. Conclusions
In this note we used a simple game model to study the optimal cleanup of an apartment that
was shared by  college students who were pressed for time. From an individual perspective,
these students disliked cleaning. However, they also all preferred a clean apartment to a dirty one.
Hence, for any student  where  this student’s utility was the total number of hours spent
by all the  students cleaning less a number  times the hours spent cleaning by himself. In this
setting, we first determined the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when the number  was less than
unity. Second, we computed the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when  was greater than unity.
Finally, for specific values of  and  we showed that the Nash equilibrium in the  case was
Pareto efficient. 
The analysis in this note can be extended in a number of directions. Here are two suggestions
for extending the research described here. First, it would be useful to introduce uncertainty into the
9model and to study a scenario in which it is not possible to definitively ascertain whether and the
extent to which a particular student has fulfilled his apartment cleaning duties. Second, in an
intertemporal setting, it would be helpful to see if any agreement that the harried college students can
come up with about establishing who will clean when and for how long, is renegotiation-proof.
Studies of apartment cleaning and, more generally, the performance of necessary chores by time
constrained college students that incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will
provide additional insights into a time allocation problem that has significant economic and social
implications for young people.
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